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THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:
MYTHS AND REALITIES
James J. Fishman*
I have followed the development of CUNY Law School from its
founding, and I really have to salute you.  I do not know exactly
where legal education is going, but I think CUNY is going to get
there before other law schools, including my own.  Today, I am
going to explore some of the myths and realities of the nonprofit
sector.
MYTH NUMBER ONE: THERE IS A UNITARY CONCEPT
OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
First, the idea of a singular “nonprofit sector” itself is a myth.
There are really many sectors.  According to tax law, there are at
least twenty-eight types of organizations entitled to tax-exempt sta-
tus.1  I will be talking about one of those sectors: the section
501(c)(3) organizations, the charitable nonprofits.
Traditionally, the 501(c)(3)s have been divided into two cate-
gories: public charities and private foundations.  Private founda-
tions have been described as a pool of money surrounded by
people trying to get some of it.2  But in a tax sense, private founda-
tions are essentially organizations that have failed certain tests of
public support.3  The other portion of 501(c)(3)s are public chari-
ties.  These are organizations to which contributions are deductible
for federal tax purposes.4  Over one-half of all organizations recog-
nized as exempt by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are in this
group.5
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1 I.R.C. § 501(c)(1)–(28), (d), (e), (f), (k) (West Supp. 2006). See also I.R.C.
§ 521(a) (West Supp. 2006) (farmers’ cooperative organizations).
2 “To author Dwight MacDonald, the Ford Foundation was ‘a large body of
money completely surrounded by people who want some.’” JAMES J. FISHMAN & STE-
PHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 753 (3d ed. 2006).
3 More specifically, private foundations are organizations that fail the public sup-
port tests of I.R.C. § 509.
4 I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2) (income tax), 2055(a)(2) (estate tax), 2522(a)(2) (gift tax).
Only donations to organizations that test for public safety are not deductible.
5 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts:
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Within this category of 501(c)(3), vastly different organiza-
tions are treated alike.  I believe that the charitable sector needs to
be redefined and perhaps narrowed.  In the past, public benefit
and relief of the poor were the central purposes of public charities.
This is no longer the case.  Today this sector has become broader
and encompasses organizations with assets of billions of dollars,
from Harvard and hospital systems to a three-member dance com-
pany with no assets.  The 501(c)(3) sector is also broad in terms of
their sources of funding—government at all levels supports it, and
it receives fees for services and funding from foundations, corpora-
tions, and private donations.  Mark A. Hall and John D. Colombo
have suggested that public charities shoul be limited to organiza-
tions that receive a certain amount of their budgets from private
donations.6
Also, the scale of activity of some charitable nonprofits is abso-
lutely immense.  At some point quantitative differences in size be-
come qualitative ones.  One of the justifications for nonprofit
organizations—and this was raised during one of the panels this
morning—is that nonprofits emerge where there is market failure;
that is, where the commercial market does not provide a particular
kind of service or good.  Despite this rationale for nonprofit activ-
ity, many nonprofits compete with and resemble their for-profit
counterparts.  The prime examples are nonprofit hospitals, which
are much closer to their for-profit cohorts than they are to other
charitable organizations.  I question whether this kind of nonprofit
should be allowed to exist as a section 501(c)(3) without the organ-
ization demonstrating a tangible community benefit.7  Do these or-
[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organ-
ized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national
or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no sub-
stantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or oth-
erwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing
of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to)
any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
6 Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemp-
tion, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1450–51 (1991).  Charities would be eligible for public
support once the level of private giving signified “a great enough market failure that
subsidization through the tax system is warranted to correct the undersupply of a
desired good or service, yet not so high that the effect of the subsidy is nil.” Id. at
1451.
7 The affirmative test of exemption for hospitals changed from a “relief of pov-
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ganizations exist to benefit the community, especially when they
provide virtually no charitable care?
Rulemakers have also lost sight of the diversity of organiza-
tions possible within section 501(c)(3), leaving some organizations
underrepresented and their needs ignored.  Congress has pro-
posed numerous changes for the sector, ostensibly to increase
transparency and diminish fraud.  Many of the proposals would in-
crease the regulatory burden for nonprofits.  These congressional
initiatives resulted in the leading representative of nonprofits, the
Independent Sector, to create a panel which issued a report to re-
spond to congressional proposals.8  The process of response en-
gaged the elite players in the nonprofit world, but not the smaller
organizations that make up most of the public charity sector.  The
panel’s membership did not reflect the diversity of the charitable
nonprofit sector.  Small groups, community-based organizations,
and rural organizations were not members of this panel.  The
panel proposed increasing self-regulation and opposed efforts to
curtail some potential abuses that would affect some of its primary
members, such as foundation trustee compensation.9  The panel
supported proposals that would have the effect of increasing the
filing burdens on smaller nonprofits.10
We should be asking some questions about the 501(c)(3) uni-
verse.  What is the role of nonprofits in a modern economy?  What
should be the role of government in financing charitable activities,
and what sort of control should the government have over these
activities?  Should charities be allowed to compete with for-profit
organizations and under what circumstances?  When should state
action force private organizations to open their operations to scru-
tiny?  How much community benefit should an organization pro-
vide before it is eligible for 501(c)(3) status?  Should we require
charitable nonprofits to help the poor and provide tangible public
benefits?
erty” rationale, which required hospitals to treat indigent patients without regard to
their ability to pay, see Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202; to a community benefit stan-
dard, where charity care was not a requirement.  Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. See
also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 22, at 353–77.
8 INDEPENDENT SECTOR, PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: STRENGTHENING TRANS-
PARENCY, GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2005),
available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel_Final_Report.pdf.
9 Id. at 85–91.
10 Id.
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MYTH NUMBER TWO: THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IS AN INDEPENDENT
SECTOR STANDING BETWEEN BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT
Another myth is the idea that the nonprofit sector stands be-
tween government and the public sector.  The aforementioned
leading association of nonprofits is called the Independent Sector,
an oxymoron for the 501(c)(3) world.  Nonprofits are far from in-
dependent of private enterprise or government.  There is an ex-
traordinary degree of interface between government and
nonprofits today.  Nonprofits mimic for-profit firms, and the pri-
vate sector plays an enormous role in the nonprofit sector.11  Many
nonprofits engage substantially, if not excessively, in regular busi-
ness activity.  If you have ever been to the Museum of Modern Art
or to the Metropolitan Museum of Art and have visited their shops,
you have seen that they are like department stores.  We need to
examine universities and how they profit from the commercialism
of higher education: lucrative research, licensing deals, and forays
into dot-com businesses.  There is a growing trend of nonprofit or-
ganizations spawning for-profit subsidiaries.  National Geographic
and The Children’s Television Workshop have for-profit subsidiar-
ies that make tens of millions of dollars.12  The IRS has become
concerned about the enormous increase in joint ventures between
for-profits and nonprofits.13  At the same time, for-profit firms are
encroaching upon traditional nonprofit turf, such as healthcare
and education.
Government—the public sector—and the private nonprofit
sector are elaborately interconnected and affect one another.  Con-
gress routinely authorizes, and federal agencies administer, many
11 See Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing: Growing Links
Between Nonprofits and the Rest of the Economy, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE
COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 1–4 (Burton A. Weisbrod
ed., 1998).
12 Stephanie Strom, What’s Wrong with Profit?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at F1.
(“[T]he National Geographic Society, a nonprofit group . . . is sustained by sales of
everything from magazines to toys”); Stephanie Strom, Nonprofit Groups Reach for Prof-
its on the Side, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, at A32 (“Tickle Me Elmo, a popular toy from
a few Christmases back, still generates a handsome licensing fee for the Children’s
Television Workshop. . . .”).
13 The Service, in a number of rulings and cases, has established parameters for
joint ventures between nonprofits and for-profits. See, e.g., St. David’s Health Care
Sys. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232, 233–34 (5th Cir. 2003); Redlands Surgical Servs. v.
Comm’r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), aff’d, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Rev. Rul. 2004-51,
2004-22 I.R.B. 974, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb04-51.pdf; Rev.
Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb98-12.pdf.
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domestic policy programs through nonprofit organizations.14  Pri-
vate nonprofit agencies may receive all or nearly all of their reve-
nue from the government.  This ranges from social service
nonprofits to the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory, which is non-
profit and administered by a university.15  How independent are
organizations that are primarily or exclusively funded by the gov-
ernment?  Should these organizations be treated as government
agencies?  Should Freedom of Information mandates apply?
MYTH NUMBER THREE: THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS DATES FROM THE END OF THE
SECOND WORLD WAR
Another myth is that the intersection between government
and the nonprofit sector arose at the end of World War II with the
expansion of funding for higher education and healthcare.  In ac-
tuality, our history shows that nonprofits and government have al-
ways been linked.  Harvard College, for example, was chartered as
a corporation, governed by administrators of the tax-supported
Congregational Church, and had government officials serving as ex
officios of the board.16  Its endowment was from private donors, tui-
tion, and other service fees.  Until the 1830s, Harvard considered
itself a public institution, not a private one.17  Government has al-
ways been closely affiliated with the nonprofit sector.
MYTH NUMBER FOUR: THERE IS A GREAT INCREASE OF
CONTEMPORARY WRONGDOING AND SCANDAL IN THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR
We have seen a seeming proliferation of scandals in the non-
profit sector and a growth of press coverage of these scandals.  One
scandal is one too many.  In recent weeks, we found out that the
president of the Getty Museum is paid over a million dollars a year
and was given a $70,000 Porsche SUV; he and his wife were given
first-class travel around the world; and he had a member of the
museum staff express mail an umbrella as well as his mail, among
14 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 595
(2000).
15 University of California: National Labs, http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/
labs/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2007).
16 Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector, in PETER DOBKIN HALL, IN-
VENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND OTHER ESSAYS ON PHILANTHROPY, VOLUNTEERISM
AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 16–17 (1992).
17 Id. at 17.  It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that Harvard could be
considered private in the modern sense. Id.
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other abuses.18  At the Grolier Club, a club of bibliophiles—and
perhaps the most law-abiding, decent people you can imagine—
there have been claims of self-dealing.19  The Nature Conservancy
was involved in questionable transactions with insiders, inept stew-
ardship, and evaluation abuses.20  There has been excessive private
foundation compensation.  Paul C. Cabot, Jr. of the Cabot Founda-
tion received over one million dollars in annual compensation and
took another four million dollars for personal expenses, including
his daughter’s wedding.21
Attorneys General have been increasingly active, and between
1995 and 2002 there were 152 reported incidents of civil and crimi-
nal misconduct.22  But in the context of 50,000 nonprofits in New
York State alone, this is hardly an epidemic.  Congress, however, is
reacting to this negative coverage and formulating new legislation
for nonprofits with demands for improvement in transparency and
governance.  The Senate Finance Committee supports the federal
government as a regulator of nonprofits, which increases the cost
of compliance and enforcement.23  The House Ways and Means
Committee offered a more interesting theoretical approach.  They
focused on the elusive definition of “nonprofit” and the need for
more coherent tax exemption qualification standards.24  The
18 See Jason Felch, et al., Munitz Steps Down As Head of Getty Trust, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2006, at A1.
19 Stephanie Strom, Bibliophiles Disagree over Price of Air Above, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2006, at B1.
20 See Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells Scenic Acreage to Allies at a
Loss, WASH. POST, May 6, 2003, at A1 (detailing pattern of the Conservancy reselling
donated land at a loss to trustees and supporters only to have them make cash dona-
tions roughly equaling the difference, allowing them to take “significant tax deduc-
tions”).  The Washington Post’s coverage triggered an IRS audit and an investigation
and report by the Senate Finance Committee staff. SENATE FIN. COMM. STAFF, FINANCE
COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, at V (2003), available at http://
finance.senate.gov/hearings/other/tnccontents.pdf.
21 See Francie Latour & Walter V. Robinston, Trustees to Reimburse Charitable Founda-
tion, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2006, at B1; Walter V. Robinson & Michael Rezendes,
Foundation Chief Agrees to Repay over $4m, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2004, at A1.
22 Marion Fremont Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of
Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995–2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 25, 25 (2003).
The study reviewed newspaper reports of charity scandals published between 1995
and 2002 by Lexis/Nexis, an online service that retains 13,111 English-language news
sources, including daily newspapers from all major American cities. Id.
23 Charities and Charitable Giving: Proposals for Reform: Hearing Before the S. Finance
Comm., 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/20838.
pdf.
24 Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
109th Cong. (2005), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?form-
mode=printfriendly&id=3039.
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House asked, “Is the extent to which charities are providing ser-
vices to the public commensurate with their favored tax status?”25
Unfortunately, they only held a one-day hearing on the matter.26
One needs to apply a historical perspective to charity fraud.
This perspective offers a very different view of contemporary
wrongdoing in the nonprofit sector.  My book The Faithless Fiduciary
and the Quest for Charitable Accountability is an historical study that
examines scandals involving charitable organizations from the year
1200 to 2000.27  One thing I can say with assurance is that scandal
and fraud have always been rampant among charitable
organizations.
For example, one notorious scandal occurred at an alms-
house, the Hospital of St. Cross, in Winchester, England.28  It was
founded in 1132 by Bishop Henri De Blois of Winchester, the
grandson of William the Conqueror and the brother of King
Steven, one of England’s worst monarchs, who offers comparison
to our current administration in Washington.  St. Cross is still in
existence, and if you visit there you will be offered a piece of bread
and a draught of beer, even though you are probably not a pilgrim
on your way to Canterbury.  De Blois, like many modern donors,
had mixed motives.  He wanted to become an archbishop, and
what better way to do so than by founding an almshouse?
This almshouse was an old age home that originally took care
of thirteen elderly men and fed many other poor.  Every 150 years,
St. Cross has faced scandal.  Although the fact situations differ,
they always revolve around a fiduciary who engages in an excess
benefit transaction, a conversion of nonprofit assets to for-profit
purposes, unrelated business activities, or just plain theft.  For ex-
ample, the first known resident was a man named Conan (not the
barbarian).  He was not poor, as the founding charter specified;
instead, he was a property owner and money lender.  De Blois pur-
chased some property from Conan, who received a payment:  The
bishop promised Conan that he would be able to reside perma-
nently in this almshouse.
The most recent scandal occurred in 1853.  The assets of St.
Cross had greatly increased.  There developed a tradition that the
master of the hospital29 would pocket the increase.  Uncovering
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE FAITHLESS FIDUCIARY AND THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR NON-
PROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY (2006).
28 Id. at 50–51.
29 The “master” or “warden” is the title of the cleric in charge of the hospital.
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and ending this practice became a cause ce´le`bre throughout the
country.  For twenty years prior, Parliament had tried to introduce
a bill to regulate charities.  This scandal enabled the creation of a
charity commission, which is the model for all Anglo-American reg-
ulatory bodies.  That was one good thing which happened from the
1853 incident.  It also inspired the novelist Anthony Trollope to
write his first successful novel, The Warden.30
In the United States, scandal also goes far back in our history
to the first years of European settlement.31  The first that I have
found involved Edward Hopkins.  He was one of the earliest set-
tlers of Connecticut and had been either deputy governor or gov-
ernor of the state for fourteen years.  Hopkins was one of the
wealthiest men in the state.  His first fortune was obtained the old
fashioned way:  He married into it.  He died in England in 1657
and left a bequest to found some schools in Connecticut and a
college to train the clergy.  There was a clerical dispute.  One of
the trustees of Hopkins’s estate moved to Massachusetts.  When the
dust finally cleared, where did this bequest go?  To Harvard.  Yale
has always claimed that the money belonged to it, although it was
founded later.
Another early scandal involved John Hancock, who signed his
name in large handwriting on the Declaration of Independence.
He had been chosen treasurer of Harvard College in 1773.  After
he became President of the Continental Congress, Hancock took
the books and assets of Harvard College with him to Philadelphia
and refused to give them back—or to give an accounting of the
College’s assets.  The Board of Overseers finally ousted him.  He
eventually gave back some of the money, but neither he nor his
heirs ever returned the full amount.32
In the nineteenth century, war and economic depression en-
couraged all kinds of charity frauds.  In 1879, a “Ponzi scheme”
occurred nearly fifty years before Charles Ponzi, a Boston swindler,
gave his name to this particular scam.33  Mrs. Sarah E. Howe estab-
lished the Ladies Depositary Trust and promised investors interest
30 ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WARDEN (Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1855).
31 See FISHMAN, supra note 27, at 247–56.
32 Id. at 257–59.
33 A Ponzi scheme works by taking funds of later investors to pay the earlier inves-
tors an extraordinarily high rate of interest, attracting new dupes; eventually, the
number of new investors declines, and inevitably the scheme collapses. MITCHELL
ZUCKOFF, PONZI’S SCHEME: THE TRUE STORY OF A FINANCIAL LEGEND 314 (2005) (biog-
raphy of Ponzi).  Neither Mrs. Howe nor Ponzi were innovators.  These types of swin-
dles occurred frequently in Europe in the nineteenth century.
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of 8% per month, paid quarterly in advance on deposits of $200 to
$1000.  Only single working women of modest means were eligible
for such spectacular returns.  The Ladies Deposit described itself as
a charitable institution for single ladies, old and young.  The prin-
cipal could be withdrawn upon call any day except Sunday.  No
deposit would be received from persons owning a house.  A group
of anonymous Quaker philanthropists supposedly paid the inter-
est.34  There were no such philanthropists, and, after the inevitable
crash, Mrs. Howe was sent to jail.
In the early 20th century came the first telemarketing scam.
An apocryphal Senator Peter Justice Fogerty called, on behalf of an
imaginary political club, for donations of Christmas baskets for the
poor.  As this demonstrates, charity fraud is nothing new.  I believe
that with the invention of the Internet, the sensitivity of most non-
profit managers, and the increasing scrutiny of the press, there is
more probity today in the sector than ever before.
MYTH NUMBER FIVE: TOO MANY NONPROFITS ARE
UNACCOUNTABLE, AND THERE IS TOO
LITTLE TRANSPARENCY
We live in an age where there are continuing demands for
greater accountability.  Good governance facilitates well-run chari-
ties and dissuades improper behavior.  Transparency sheds light on
organizational practices, which in turn should enhance ethical and
effective operations and facilitate oversight.  There are several as-
pects to the concept of accountability: one is financial accountabil-
ity; another is mission accountability.  It is a lot easier to determine
whether an organization is spending its money properly than to
measure the quality of the charity’s activities.  What are the appro-
priate benchmarks to use when it comes to social values and ser-
vices, along with a heavy emphasis on quantification of such
measures?  How do you assure consistency between organizations?
What measures are used?
The demand for greater accountability has been followed by
imposing more record-keeping and filing requirements and has
34 FISHMAN, supra note 27, at 260–62.  In the 1990s there was a similar scheme
involving the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, which promised charities that
they could double their investment with the Foundation in one year—anonymous
philanthropists again were the supposed sponsors.  Steve Stecklow & Joseph Rebello,
IRS Is Studying Whether New Era’s Donors Committed Fraud on Deductions, WALL ST. J., May
24, 1995, at A3; Steve Stecklow, Feeding the Frenzy: A New Era Consultant Lured Rich
Donors Over Pancakes, Prayers, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1995, at A1; Peter Dobrin & L. Stuart
Ditzen, A Bankruptcy Shakes World of Charities, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 16, 1995, at A1.
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led some states and some larger charities to adopt the Sarbanes-
Oxley requirements, a very expensive regulatory scheme.  A study
by John Hopkins University showed that over half of the 247 largest
charities had adopted these requirements.35  If smaller nonprofits
are mandated to adopt these requirements it will divert money that
would be better applied to the mission of the organization.  Is
there any evidence that creating more complex filing requirements
or imposing more burdens on board members, who are over-
whelmingly volunteers, will create greater accountability?
MYTH NUMBER SIX: ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO ASSURE
INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY SHOULD COME FROM THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The demand to improve the accountability of charitable organ-
izations is nothing new.  As far back as 1305, Pope Clement V drew
attention to the waste and misappropriation in hospitals.36  He or-
dered an annual inventory.  This early effort is perhaps the histori-
cal forebearer of Form 990, the Annual Report that 501(c)(3)
charities must file if they have revenues over $25,000.37  For much
of our history, accountability has been a local matter.  In the nine-
teenth century, fraud was handled by district attorneys and local
agencies.  The district attorneys’ approach was to shut down organ-
izations and send fiduciaries that breached their trust to jail.  At
the same time, organizations such as the Charity Organization Soci-
ety advised people not to give money to certain organizations.  Ac-
countability and fiduciary standards on the federal level are
relatively recent.  In 1969, foundations were placed under a very
rigorous regulatory regime, which has begun to migrate toward
public charities.38
The IRS cannot be an efficient and effective regulator of non-
profits.  There is a need for a new template.  I think we ought to
create a close nonprofit corporation, similar to close for-profit cor-
porations.  In corporate law, close corporations differ from public
corporations in that they are smaller and less regulated.39  If a non-
35 LESTER SALAMON & STEPHANIE L. GELLER, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTA-
BILITY 9, 15 n.5 (2005), available at http://www.jhu.edu/listeningpost/news/pdf/
comm04.pdf.
36 See FISHMAN, supra note 27, at 44.
37 I.R.S. Form 990, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.
38 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 22, at 751.
39 In New York, close corporations are corporations that are not listed on a securi-
ties exchange or the over-the-counter market. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 620(C),
1104(A) (McKinney 2003).  In some jurisdictions, Delaware, for instance, there are
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profit has revenues of less than $100,000, I would exempt it from
regulations concerned with conflicts of interest and filing require-
ments.  I would treat such arrangements essentially as incorporated
partnerships.
There are two broad approaches or theories of regulation: one
advocates increasing the number of rules; another advocates in-
creased enforcement.  I am in favor of increasing enforcement.  I
would provide additional funding for the IRS and for state attor-
neys general to hire more auditors instead of writing more rules,
which seems to be the current approach.  When you have a large
number of rules, the burden of adhering to them falls unequally
on smaller nonprofits.  For a large nonprofit hospital, for example,
added recordkeeping and filing requirements are just a cost of do-
ing business.  Smaller organizations have difficulty complying with
increased mandates because of a lack of technical sophistication
and resources to hire experts.
State regulation is also inefficient, ineffective, and, in some
cases, capricious.  Enforcement should be locally controlled.  I sug-
gest that we return to the charity commissions which were estab-
lished in the seventeenth century under the English Statute of
Charitable Uses.40  The purpose of that statute was to set up com-
missions in every parish so people could complain about how char-
itable funds were being misused.  The commissioners would
determine if there was probable cause and would impanel a jury,
who would reach a decision, appealable to Chancery.
These are challenging times for charities, and the sector is
under enormous criticism.  We are going to see some new regula-
tions.  I do not think that we need new regulations or burdens,
particularly those that impact smaller organizations.  We need
some new ideas.
special statutory rules for close corporations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 341–50
(2006).
40 1601, 42 Eliz. c. 4. See FISHMAN, supra note 27, at 105–07.

